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Conflict-of-Interest Reforms
and Investment Bank Analysts’
Research Biases
Yuyan Guan1, Hai Lu2, and M. H. Franco Wong2
Abstract
This study examines the consequences of the series of reforms targeting investment
banking–related conflicts of interest. The authors compare and contrast optimism biases in
analysts’ stock recommendations and earnings forecasts across different types of analyst
firms in the postreform period of 2004 to 2007 versus the prereform period of 1998 to
2001. The authors document a significant reduction in the relative optimism of sanctioned
investment bank analysts’ stock recommendations but not in their earnings forecasts.
Moreover, the authors find little change in the profitability of their stock recommendations
but detect a drop in the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by investment bank analysts.
In sum, the reforms achieve the objective of mitigating the apparent optimism in investment
bank stock recommendations, but they do not provide benefit to investors in terms of
more profitable recommendations or more accurate earnings forecasts.
Keywords
equity analyst, conflicts of interest, securities regulations, investment banks
Biased analyst research is believed to have contributed to large investor losses during the
stock market downturn in 2000 and 2001. Investors, the business press, and regulators have
long suspected that investment bank analysts bias their research in return for investment
banking business from the companies they follow (see, for example, Becker, 2001;
Morgenson, 2001). In response to these allegations, the financial industry endorsed a set of
‘‘best practices’’ in 2000 to restore public confidence in the credibility of equity research.
Several other regulations followed, and the reforms culminated in April 2003 when the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed enforcement actions against 10 of the
largest U.S. investment banks (the so-called ‘‘Global Settlement’’). These reforms resulted
in sweeping changes in the investment research industry, especially regarding the way
investment banks compensate their research analysts and structure the operation of their
research and investment banking departments.
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Concerns have been voiced regarding the effectiveness of these reforms. The incentive
related to investment-banking businesses is only one of the several types of incentives that
could potentially cause analyst research biases. Specifically, the incentive to generate trad-
ing commissions, which is not addressed by the reforms, will continue to drive analyst
research optimism (e.g., Cowen, Groysberg, & Healy, 2006; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005).
This is of particular concern for investment bank research, as its research funding source is
shifted from underwriting to trading because of the reforms. Hence, it is an empirical ques-
tion whether the conflict-of-interest reforms have achieved the goal of improving the objec-
tivity of investment research.
In this article, we examine the impact of the reforms on investment bank analysts’
research biases. If the reforms resolve investment banking–related conflicts of interest, we
expect to find a reduction in investment bank analysts’ research biases in the postreform
period, ceteris paribus. We conduct our tests on analysts from different type of securities
firms (research firms, brokerage firms, syndicate banks, and investment banks), and we
also separate investment banks into nonsanctioned and sanctioned banks to examine the
incremental effect of the Global Settlement.1 We examine the change in analysts’ research
biases between the prereform period (January 1998-December 2001) and postreform period
(January 2004-December 2007).
We document two key results. First, we find a significant reduction in the relative opti-
mism of sanctioned bank stock recommendations but no change in the relative optimism of
their earnings forecasts.2 Second, we show that sanctioned bank analysts become signifi-
cantly less optimistic than research firm analysts in the postreform period. These findings
are consistent with the reforms reducing the optimism of stock recommendations issued by
analysts from sanctioned investment banks. This eases the concern that the reforms might
induce other biases to investment bank research as their incentive has shifted from gaining
investment banking businesses to generating trading commissions.
However, there are reasons to believe that the reforms have unintended consequences on
the quality of research. First, Mehran and Stulz (2007) argue that if investment bank ana-
lysts provide better research as a consequence of the conflicts, the consumers of this
research will benefit. Moreover, these conflicts impose deadweight costs on investment
banks because their customers take the conflicts into account, and hence, investment banks
already have incentives to reduce these conflicts and the associated costs. Any regulation
might simply replace these deadweight costs with regulatory costs. Second, without funding
provided by investment banking businesses, research departments might have to reduce
their coverage or the quality of their research (e.g., Boni, 2006; Boni & Womack, 2002;
O’Leary, 2007), and elite analysts might leave sell-side research to pursue other lucrative
opportunities (e.g., Groysberg, Healy, & Chapman, 2008; Mattlin, 2007; Pizzani, 2009;
Guan, Lu, & Wong, 2009). Third, participation of equity analysts in investment banking
deals helps analysts become more familiar with the companies and their industries (e.g.,
Mattlin, 2007; Jacob, Rock, & Weber, 2008; Mehran & Stulz, 2007; Pizzani, 2009). Hence,
separating research from investment banking activities may reduce the quality of invest-
ment research.
Consistent with these arguments, we document that sanctioned bank buy recommenda-
tions become less profitable, whereas the profitability of sell/hold recommendations
improves insignificantly. Moreover, the accuracy of investment bank forecasts drops. These
results are consistent with the reforms providing little incremental benefit to investors in
terms of more profitable recommendations or more accurate forecasts (Kim, 2009; Mehran
& Stulz, 2007).3 These findings also call into question the efficacy of a Global Settlement
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requirement that sanctioned banks furnish third-party independent research to their retail
clients. This is because research firms are more optimistic in their earnings forecasts and
recommendations in the postreform period. Moreover, the accuracy of their forecasts and
the profitability of their recommendations are not significantly different from those of
investment banks after the reforms.4
This study adds to the strand of literature examining investment banking–related con-
flicts of interest as the cause of the research biases in various prereform periods (see, for
example, Agrawal & Chen, 2008; Cowen et al., 2006; Jacob, Rock, & Weber, 2008;
Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, & Yan, 2007). In general, these studies find mixed evi-
dence that investment banks issued more optimistic forecasts or recommendations than
noninvestment banks (see Mehran & Stulz, 2007, for a summary). We use the reforms as a
unique setting to shed further light on this issue. In particular, if investment bank analysts
were biased because of conflicts of interest, their banks would take actions to alleviate the
biases in response to the reforms. The larger the incentive problem in the prereform period,
the bigger will be the reduction in analysts’ optimistic biases as a result of the mitigating
actions taken by the banks. We document that the reduction in the relative recommendation
optimism of sanctioned bank analysts is larger than that of their research firm counterparts,
which is consistent with sanctioned investment bank analysts being optimistically biased in
the prereform period and reacting to the reforms swiftly as a result.
This study also adds to Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) and Kadan,
Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009), which investigate the effect of the reforms on the prop-
erties of stock recommendations using a postreform period ending in June 2003 and
December 2004, respectively. Our tests supplement these two studies by examining the
long-term effect of the reforms using a longer postreform period: from January 2004
through December 2007. Moreover, as discussed below in the section titled
‘‘Recommendation Optimism,’’ our research design is different from the research designs
of these two studies and, hence, provides triangulating evidence on the economic conse-
quences of the reforms.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section titled ‘‘Reforms on Analyst
Conflicts of Interest’’ summarizes the series of reforms. Section titled ‘‘Sample and Data’’
describes the sample and data, whereas section titled ‘‘Model Specification, Variable
Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics’’ explains our research design. Sections titled
‘‘Empirical Findings on Stock Recommendations’’ and ‘‘Empirical Findings on Earnings
Forecasts’’ present the empirical results on stock recommendations and earnings forecasts,
respectively, and the final section ‘‘Concluding Remarks’’ provides concluding remarks.
Reforms on Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Equity research analysts play an important role as information intermediaries. They help
investors make investment decisions and improve the informational efficiency of the stock
markets. However, concerns exist about the objectivity of analyst research. In particular,
analysts are accused of hyping stocks to secure management access, to generate brokerage
commissions or to attract investment-banking business. As a result, the financial industry,
self-regulatory organizations (SROs), and regulators introduced proposals or rules to restore
public confidence in the independence of research analysts and objectivity of analyst
research.
Recognizing the conflicts of interests in equity research, the Securities Industry
Association endorsed a compilation of ‘‘best practices’’ in June 2000. These practices
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recommend the following guidelines: Research departments should not report to investment
banking units, analysts’ compensation should not be tied to investment banking business,
firms should disclose analysts’ financial interests, and analysts should not trade contrary to
their recommendations.
Also in 2000, the Association for Investment Management and Research (now the CFA
Institute) formed a task force on analyst independence and released a white paper titled
‘‘Preserving the Integrity of Research.’’ It addresses the potential conflicts of interest for
sell-side analysts that ‘‘may bias their research reports and recommendations.’’
Subsequently, the CFA Institute established its ‘‘Research Objective Standards (ROS),’’
which provide ethical standards and specific recommended practices to guide investment
firms worldwide and their respective employees in achieving objectivity of research
reports. These ROS are broad, covering issues on public appearances, investment banking,
analyst compensation, relationships with subject companies, personal investments and trad-
ing, disclosure, and rating systems.
In February 2002, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD)5 filed the first round of proposed SRO rules: amendments to
NYSE Rule 351 (reporting requirements) and Rule 472 (communications with the public)
and the new NASD Rule 2711 (Research Analysts and Research Reports). The U.S. SEC
approved these new rules on May 20, 2002. These rules require comprehensive disclosure
of conflicts of interest in research reports and public appearances by research analysts. The
rules prohibit the involvement of investment banking personnel in determining research
report content and analyst compensation. These rules also establish stringent disclosure
requirements for research reports and prescribe that research reports must explain the mean-
ing of their rating systems in stock recommendations and disclose data that help investors
track the correlation between the rating and stock price movements.
The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002. Section 501 of the Act
addresses conflicts of interest that can arise when security analysts recommend equity secu-
rities in research reports and public appearances. In December 2002, the SEC proposed
enforcement actions against 10 of the top U.S. investment banks. The so-called ‘‘Global
Research Analyst Settlement’’ aims to resolve,
Undue influence of investment banking interests on securities research at brokerage
firms. The settlement, which was finalized on April 28, 2003, is expected to bring
about balanced reform in the industry and bolster confidence in the integrity of
equity research. (SEC December 20, 2002 press release, 2002-179)
Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Global Settlement require structural
reforms that fundamentally changed practices in the investment industry. First, firms must
physically separate the investment banking and research departments and restrict interaction
between them. Senior management of the firms set the budgets of the research departments
without input from investment bankers and without tying the budget to revenues from
investment banking. Research analyst involvement in investment banking activities or
receiving compensation derived from investment banking revenues is prohibited.
Investment bankers do not take part in evaluating analysts’ job performance or determining
their compensation. Research management makes all decisions to initiate or terminate the
coverage of companies. Second, sanctioned banks must contract with at least three indepen-
dent research firms that will furnish independent research to the banks’ research clients for
a 5-year period. Last but not least, these banks must publicly disclose their research
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analysts’ historical ratings and price-target forecasts to assist investors in evaluating the
performance of analysts.
Sample and Data
Our sample of analysts comes from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (I/B/E/S) database and covers the period from January 1998 to December 2007.
We divide the sample into three subperiods: the prereform period (January 1998-December
2001), the transition period (January 2002-December 2003), and the postreform period
(January 2004-December 2007). We examine the change in analysts’ research biases
between the pre- and postreform periods. We exclude the transition period from the analy-
sis because it is the period when the reforms were proposed, deliberated, and implemented.
As the regulatory environment underwent continual changes during the transition period,
including this period, our analysis could potentially have induced ‘‘background noise’’ in
estimating the permanent effect of the reforms on analysts’ research biases.
We retrieve all analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from the I/B/E/S
database in 2008. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) indicate that all post-2006 I/B/
E/S stock recommendation data are free from the errors they identified in their study. We
use the 2006 I/B/E/S translation file to identify the affiliation and name of each equity ana-
lyst, which allows us to have a sample spanning the period from January 1998 through
December 2007.6 Stock price and return data are from Center for Research in Security
Prices and financial statement data are from Compustat.
An analyst is considered to be subject to investment banking conflict of interest if he or
she is working for an investment bank. Following Clarke et al. (2004) and Cowen et al.
(2006), we classify securities firms into four types based on information from Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Research (2000-2007) and Securities Data Company (SDC) data-
base.7 First, investment banks are those listed as investment banks by Nelson’s and identi-
fied as lead or colead underwriters by SDC. We further divide the investment banks into
sanctioned and nonsanctioned banks. The sanctioned banks are Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse
First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J. P. Morgan Securities, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Global Markets (formerly known as Salomon Smith Barney),
UBS Warburg, and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Second, syndicate banks are those firms
listed by Nelson’s as either investment banks or brokers and identified by SDC as managers
or comanagers but not as lead or colead underwriters.8 Third, research firms are those
listed as such by Nelson’s and not found in the SDC database. Fourth, brokerage firms are
those firms classified by Nelson’s as major institutional brokers, major or small regional
brokers, or investment banks/brokers that are not identified as lead/colead underwriters or
managers/comanagers by SDC.9
The final sample consists of those analysts who make both stock recommendations and
earnings forecasts. The sample is further subject to two additional restrictions to facilitate
the calculation of the analyst-specific relative research bias measures. First, we compute
these measures using only company-year observations that are followed by at least three
analysts. Second, we calculate these measures using companies that are covered by at least
one research firm analyst and one investment bank analyst in a particular forecasting
period. The latter restriction is done to ensure a fair comparison of the research biases of
research firm analysts with those of their investment bank counterparts. In particular, it
rules out the possibility that difference in coverage is driving the difference in the research
biases of these two types of analysts (we further control for the difference in the portfolio
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of companies covered by analysts in subsequent regression analysis). Although this restric-
tion reduces the number of company-years used in the computation of these measures, the
results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged if we do not impose this
restriction.10
Table 1 reports the number of analysts in the sample, the number of securities firms rep-
resented by these analysts, and the number of companies included in the computation of
analyst-specific relative bias measures. Consistent with prior studies, Panel A shows that
the majority of the analysts in our sample come from investment banks (both sanctioned
and nonsanctioned banks). The number of analysts increases from the prereform period
(1998-2001) to the postreform period (2004-2007) across all five types of securities firms.
This might be attributed to the fact that more analysts are making stock recommendations
and earnings forecasts in the later part of the sample period. Panel B reports the number of
securities firms represented by our sample of analysts. The number of securities firms also
goes up in the postreform period, especially the number of research firms, which could be
due to the funding for independent research provided by the Global Settlement. Panel C
reports the number of companies used in the computation of analyst-specific relative bias
measures. To be included in the sample, a company must be followed by at least three ana-
lysts, including one research firm analyst and one investment bank analyst. The number of
companies increases sharply from the prereform period to the postreform period, which is
likely due to the increase in the number of research firm analysts in the postreform period;
hence, more companies meet the sample inclusion restrictions.
Model Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive
Statistics
We use the difference-in-differences (DD) method to investigate the impact of the reforms
on the biases of analysts’ stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. In the DD analy-
sis, we compare the change in the biases of research firm analysts to those of analysts from
different types of securities firms (brokerage firms, syndicate banks, nonsanctioned, and
sanctioned investment banks). The DD method explicitly controls for time-specific varia-
tions that are common across the groups but not attributed to the reforms per se (i.e., con-
founding effects). We also control for other sources of variations in research biases across
analysts and sample period in the DD regression model, which is specified as follows:
DEPit 5a01a1D1a2BROKERAGE1a3SYNDICATE1a4NONSANC
1a5SANCTIONED1a6D3BROKERAGE1a7D3 SYNDICATE
1a8D3NONSANC1a9D3 SANCTIONED1CONTROLS1 et;
ð1Þ
where DEP is a measure of analyst i’s research biases (to be defined in sections titled
Empirical Findings on Stock Recommendations’’ and ‘‘Empirical Findings on Earnings
Forecasts’’). D is an indicator variable that equals one in the postreform period and zero in
the prereform period. BROKERAGE, SYNDICATE, NONSANC, and SANCTIONED are
indicator variables that equal one, respectively, if analyst i is employed by a brokerage
firm, syndicate firm, nonsanctioned investment bank, and a sanctioned investment bank,
and zero otherwise.
The estimated coefficients a2 to a5 represent the prereform research biases of brokerage,
syndicate, nonsanctioned investment, and sanctioned investment firm analysts, respectively,
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Table 1. Statistics on the Numbers of Equity Analysts, Securities Firms, and Companies Being
Followed, by Firm Type and Year
Research
firms
Brokerage
firms
Syndicate
firms
Nonsanctioned
investment
banks
Sanctioned
investment
banks
Panel A: Number of analysts
1998 35 26 59 366 162
1999 40 62 136 768 401
2000 51 33 99 571 261
2001 28 21 69 398 247
2002 10 7 29 179 118
2003 39 50 148 795 490
2004 186 35 232 1,104 609
2005 201 62 207 1,076 563
2006 195 98 188 1,084 615
2007 107 95 150 911 601
Panel B: Number of securities firms
1998 9 9 25 70 10
1999 11 15 35 80 10
2000 12 14 35 75 10
2001 9 9 23 69 10
2002 8 4 14 47 10
2003 13 13 36 80 10
2004 40 21 40 88 10
2005 46 21 39 88 10
2006 47 30 40 84 10
2007 27 38 38 82 10
Panel C: Number of companies followed
1998 208 30 80 177 148
1999 351 131 183 321 274
2000 241 45 98 223 153
2001 139 31 68 117 113
2002 70 11 24 62 49
2003 435 115 240 414 378
2004 1,094 111 518 1,023 828
2005 993 162 412 947 683
2006 1,097 267 384 1,023 762
2007 803 191 261 746 683
Note: The sample covers the period from January 1998 to December 2007. The pre- and postreform periods
cover January 1998 to December 2001 and January 2004 to December 2007, respectively. Stock recommendations
and analyst earnings forecasts are from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System database. To be
included in the sample and used in the calculation of analyst-specific relative bias measures, a company must be fol-
lowed by at least three analysts and by one research firm analyst and one investment bank analyst. Investment
banks are those listed as investment banks by Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research and identified as lead or
colead underwriters by SDC database. Investment banks are further divided into sanctioned and nonsanctioned
banks. The sanctioned banks are Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, J. P.
Morgan Securities, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Global Markets (formerly known as Salomon Smith
Barney), UBS Warburg, and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Syndicate banks are those firms listed by Nelson’s as either
investment banks or brokers and identified by SDC as managers or comanagers but not lead or colead underwri-
ters. Research firms are those listed as such by Nelson’s and not found in the SDC database. The rest of the firms
are classified as brokerage firms, if they are not identified as lead/colead underwriter or manager/comanager by
SDC.
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relative to that of research firm analysts. The estimated coefficients a6 to a9 are the DD
estimates, indicating the changes in the biases of analysts from brokerage firms, syndicate
firms, and nonsanctioned and sanctioned investment banks, respectively, relative to the
change in the bias of research firm analysts.
We estimate the DD regression model using the ordinary least squares method on a
panel of analysts. Hence, we include year-dummy variables to control for unobserved time
effects, and we cluster by analyst to absorb unobserved analyst effects. Petersen (2009)
shows that if the time effect is fixed, this approach will produce unbiased standard errors.
Given the short time series, we are not able to cluster on both year and analyst or to for-
mally model the time dependence.
As the unit of analysis is analyst-year, we further control for variations across analysts
and over time in the DD regression. In particular, we control for the characteristics of the
analysts, the brokerage firms in which they work, and the portfolio of companies they cov-
ered. We rely on prior studies (e.g., Bradshaw, Richardson, & Sloan, 2006; Hong & Kubik,
2003; Jacob, Lys, & Neale, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1999) to identify the set of
variables that have shown to be associated with analyst optimism and accuracy. We discuss
these variables next.
Analyst characteristics are captured by analyst experience, number of companies fol-
lowed, analyst industry specialization, analyst turnover indicator, and percentage of new
followings. Analyst experience is the average number of years the analyst has issued earn-
ings forecasts or recommendations for the companies they follow. Number of companies
followed is the number of companies for which the analyst provides earnings forecasts in a
corresponding calendar year. Analyst specialization is the average percentage of companies
followed by the analyst with the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code as
each company being followed. The denominator is the total number of firms followed by
the analyst in the sample period 1998 to 2007. Analyst turnover is an indicator variable
that equals one in the year when the analyst left the brokerage house where she worked last
year; otherwise, it equals to zero. Percentage of new following is the percentage of compa-
nies that the analyst covers in the current year that are not being covered in the previous
year.
Brokerage firm characteristics are captured by brokerage firms’ size rank and specializa-
tion. Brokerage firm size rank is the percentile ranking of the total number of analysts
employed by the brokerage house to which the analyst belongs, relative to other brokerage
houses. Brokerage specialization is the percentage of the analyst’s brokerage house analysts
who follow company j’s industry.
Portfolio characteristics are captured by the average company size, leverage, gross
margin, sales growth, book-to-market ratio, and amount of external financing of the portfo-
lio of companies being followed by the analyst. Company size is the logarithm of the
market value of equity. Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio. Gross margin is equal to one
minus the cost of goods sold scaled by total sales. Sales growth is the growth in total net
sales. Book-to-market is the book-to-market ratio. The amount of external financing is the
net amount of cash flow received from external financing activities scaled by average total
assets.
Finally, we also control for forecast horizon and lagged relative earnings forecast accu-
racy in the regressions. Forecast horizon is the average number of days between the fore-
cast date and the forecast period end date for the portfolio of companies followed by an
analyst. Following Hong and Kubik (2003), among others, we calculate relative forecast
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accuracy, Accuracyit, by averaging Accuracyijt across all companies followed by analyst i
in calendar year t. In particular,
Accuracyijt 5 100 1003 Rankijt  1
Number Followingjt  1
 
;
where Rankijt is analyst i’s forecast accuracy rank for company j in fiscal year t, and
NumberFollowingjt is the number of analysts following company j in fiscal year t. We use
the last forecast made by each analyst for the same company and forecast period
(FY1—the current fiscal year). By construction, this measure controls for difference in the
composition of companies followed by the analysts.
Table 2 presents statistics on the control variables that we include in the DD regressions.
The statistics indicate that research firm analysts have less experience than their counter-
parts at investment banks and, on average, follow fewer companies and have more new fol-
lowing than investment bank analysts. However, investment bank analysts have higher
industry specialization and lower job turnover than other analysts. They also tend to follow
companies that are larger, more leveraged, and more profitable than those followed by
research firm analysts. Besides the cross-sectional variations, these characteristics also vary
across the two subperiods. The variations across analysts and over time could potentially
affect the relative change in analysts’ research bias over the pre- and postreform periods,
and, hence, we control for these sources of variations in the DD regressions.
Empirical Findings on Stock Recommendations
Recommendation Optimism
We first create two measures to capture the relative ranking of analysts’ stock recommen-
dations. For each company j followed by analyst i in fiscal year t, we calculate the percen-
tages of other analysts’ recommendations of company j in the same period that are more
favorable than analyst i’s recommendation (LessPOSijt) and that are less favorable
(LessNEGijt). A high (low) LessPOSijt indicates that analyst i’s recommendation of com-
pany j is relatively less (more) positive and a high (low) LessNEGijt means that analyst i’s
recommendation is relatively less (more) negative, relative to the recommendations of
other analysts for the same company. As a stock recommendation could be favorable, unfa-
vorable, or identical when compared with other recommendations, we need both LessPOSijt
and LessNEGijt to capture the relative optimism of a recommendation.
11 These two rank-
ings are computed for all companies that are followed by at least three analysts. We aver-
age LessPOSijt and LessNEGijt across all companies followed by analyst i in calendar year t
to obtain the average relative rankings, LessPOSit and LessNEGit, of analyst i in calendar
year t.
We then define a relative recommendation optimism measure, RROPTit, as the differ-
ence between LessNEGit and LessPOSit. RROPTit is a parsimonious way to combine the
information in LessNEGit and LessPOSit. A positive (negative) RROPTit indicates that ana-
lyst i is more optimistic (pessimistic) in her stock recommendations than other analysts
who follow the same companies as analyst i. The construction of RROPTit follows the
same logic of the relative forecast optimism metric of Clement (1999) and others in that it
accounts for difference in the portfolio of companies followed by different analysts and for
time effect.
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Table 3, Panel A presents the levels and changes in relative stock recommendation opti-
mism, RROPT, by subperiod and analyst affiliation. In both the pre- and postreform peri-
ods, investment bank analysts are relatively less optimistic than research firms. For
example, the average RROPT for sanctioned bank analysts is 20.071 in the postreform
period, compared with 0.059 for research firm analysts. However, columns 3 and 4 show
that analysts from syndicate firms and nonsanctioned banks exhibit a significant increase in
RROPT after the reforms. However, the increases are not significantly different from that
Table 2. Analyst, Firm, and Company Characteristics by Securities Firm Type
Research
firms
Brokerage
firms
Syndicate
firms
Nonsanctioned
banks
Sanctioned
banks
Panel A: Prereform period
Number of analyst-year observations 95 116 285 1,922 1,011
Analyst experience (years) 5.07 7.03 5.86 6.85 7.19
Number of companies following 12.19 11.94 14.12 14.84 15.72
Analyst industry specialization 0.40 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.58
Analyst turnover 0.31 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.16
Percentage of new following 0.52 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.34
Brokerage firm size rank 46.38 67.05 61.78 85.54 95.96
Brokerage firm specialization 0.49 0.28 0.38 0.25 0.19
Average company size (log) 6.11 7.99 7.42 7.30 7.76
Average leverage 0.47 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.55
Average gross margin 0.17 0.24 0.40 0.28 0.28
Average sales growth 1.43 1.21 1.46 1.51 1.48
Average book-to-market 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.47
External Financing 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05
Forecast horizon (days) 256 271 262 272 278
Panel B: Postreform period
Number of analyst-year observations 547 245 706 3,924 2,170
Analyst experience (years) 5.44 6.68 6.77 7.11 6.90
Number of companies following 11.44 11.69 12.25 14.91 14.77
Analyst industry specialization 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.59
Analyst turnover 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.12
Percentage of new following 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32
Brokerage firm size rank 61.18 60.04 72.13 86.64 97.08
Brokerage firm specialization 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.20 0.11
Average company size (log) 7.23 7.79 7.54 7.51 8.22
Average leverage 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.55
Average gross margin 0.24 0.33 0.20 0.17 0.24
Average sales growth 1.25 1.20 1.26 1.70 2.00
Average book-to-market 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42
External financing 0.02 20.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Forecast horizon (days) 273 280 284 288 288
Note: The table presents the average value of analyst, firm, and company characteristics in the pre- and postreform
periods, covering January 1998 to December 2001 and January 2004 to December 2007, respectively. See Table 1
for the classification of securities firm type. All variables are defined in the section titled ‘‘Model Specification,
Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics.’’
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of research firm analysts, as shown in columns 7 and 8. In contrast, sanctioned bank ana-
lysts become less optimistic after the reform (RROPT decreases by 0.056) and column 9
indicates that the drop is significantly different from that of research firm analysts.
To better understand the drop in the relative recommendation optimism of sanctioned
banks, we examine its two components, LessPOS and LessNEG. Column 5 in Table 3
shows that sanctioned banks experienced a significant increase in LessPOS (Panel B) and a
significant decrease in LessNEG (Panel C) after the reforms. In other words, the percentage
of other analysts who are more favorable than the sanctioned bank analysts increases,
whereas the percentage of other analysts who are less favorable decreases. Taken together,
this leads to a decrease in the relative recommendation optimism of sanctioned bank ana-
lysts. Finally, column 9 indicates that sanctioned bank analysts exhibit a change in
LessNEG that is significantly more negative than that of research firm analysts.
To shed further light on the trend of the change in relative recommendation optimism,
we plot the annual RROPT for all five firm types in Figure 1. The figure shows that the
RROPT of sanctioned bank analysts starts to decrease in 2002 and stays below the level
exhibited in the prereform period. The RROPT of analysts from other firm types either
increases (nonsanctioned bank) or fluctuates (research, brokerage, and syndicate firms)
during the sample period, and it is always higher than that of sanctioned bank analysts
since 2002. Figure 1 suggests that the reforms have a permanent mitigating effect on the
relative recommendation optimism of sanctioned bank analysts.
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Research Brokerage Syndicate
Non-Sanconed Sanconed
Figure 1. Relative stock recommendation optimism for equity analysts from five types of securities
firms, 1998-2007
Note: Relative recommendation optimism, RROPT, is computed as LessNEG minus LessPOS for each
analyst. LessPOS (LessNEG), stands for less positive (less negative), is the percentage of other analysts’
recommendations for the same company in the same period that are more (less) favorable than the
analyst’s recommendation. The graph plots the annual averages of RROPT for analysts from five differ-
ent types of securities firms: research firms, brokerage firms, syndicate banks, nonsanctioned invest-
ment banks, and sanctioned investment banks.
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Table 4. Difference-in-Differences Regressions of Relative Recommendation Optimism and its
Components (N = 11,021)
RROPT LessPOS LessNEG
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics
Intercept 22.61 3.70*** 13.39 4.10*** 36.00 10.38***
D 2.83 0.70 0.04 0.02 2.87 1.22
BROKERAGE 24.21 20.79 3.11 1.07 21.09 20.36
SYNDICATE 23.97 20.92 3.87 1.72* 20.11 20.04
NONSANC 20.40 20.11 3.32 1.19 1.92 0.85
SANCTIONED 21.16 20.29 2.53 1.23 1.37 0.58
D 3 BROKERAGE 2.91 0.49 22.08 20.64 0.83 0.25
D 3 SYNDICATE 3.77 0.80 22.79 21.14 0.98 0.36
D 3 NONSANC 20.33 20.08 21.53 20.76 21.86 20.81
D 3 SANCTIONED 29.77 22.44** 3.49 1.68* 26.28 22.68***
Relative accuracy 0.05 2.11** 20.04 22.71*** 0.02 1.15
Forecast horizon 20.03 22.86*** 0.01 2.34** 20.01 22.81***
Experience 0.09 1.19 20.01 20.32 0.08 1.82*
Number of companies following 20.08 21.65* 0.01 0.53 20.07 22.46**
Industry specialization 1.34 0.94 20.33 20.42 1.02 1.28
Analyst turnover 0.20 0.18 0.37 0.61 0.57 0.89
Percentage of new following 23.32 21.95* 1.45 1.53 21.87 22.00**
Brokerage firm size rank 20.11 23.07*** 0.03 1.43 20.08 24.11***
Brokerage firm specialization 29.27 23.38*** 3.73 2.47** 25.54 23.60***
Company size 20.60 21.70* 0.92 4.79** 0.32 1.62
Leverage 21.95 20.69 24.47 22.93*** 26.43 24.00***
Gross margin 20.001 20.29 0.001 0.89 0.0002 0.06
Sales growth 20.01 20.25 20.01 20.54 20.02 21.04
Book-to-market 0.03 1.68* 21.90 21.91* 1.15 1.16
External Financing 20.06 20.02 0.99 0.52 0.93 0.46
R2 .020 .020 .019
Note: This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the following regression:
DEPit5a01a1D1a2BROKERAGE1a3SYNDICATE1a4NONSANC1a5SANCTIONED
1a6D3 BROKERAGE1a7D3 SYNDICATE1a8D3NONSANC1a9D3 SANCTIONED
1 CONTROLS1 et;
where the dependent variable, DEP, is RROPT, LessPOS, or LessNEG. RROPT is relative recommendation optimism
for each analyst, computed as LessNEG minus LessPOS. LessPOS (LessNEG) stands for less positive (less negative)
and is the percentage of other analysts’ recommendations for the same company in the same period that are more
(less) favorable than the analyst’s recommendation. The dependent variables are multiplied by 100. D is an indicator
variable that equals to one in the postreform period (January 2004 to December 2007) and zero in the prereform
period (January 1998 to December 2001). BROKERAGE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from
brokerage firms, and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from syndi-
cate firms and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from nonsanc-
tioned full-service investment banks and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that equals to one
for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks and zero otherwise. CONTROLS represent a set of con-
trol variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are defined in the section titled ‘‘Model
Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics.’’ Year-fixed effects are also included. Robust standard
errors are clustered by analyst.
*, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t
test.
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Next, we turn to a multivariate analysis of the effect of the reform on analysts’ relative
recommendation optimism. We use a DD regression model to control for other sources of
variations that could affect the relative recommendation optimism of analysts from differ-
ent firm types.
Table 4 summarizes the DD of RROPT and its two components. In the RROPT regres-
sion, the estimated coefficients on BROKERAGE, SYNDICATE, NONSANC, and
SANCTIONED are not distinguishable from zero, indicating that there is no difference in
the level of relative recommendation optimism between research firms and other firm types
before the reforms. However, the estimated coefficient on D 3 SANCTIONED (i.e., the
DD estimate) is significantly negative at the 5% level (t = 22.44), indicating that the
reforms have a significant negative effect on the optimism of stock recommendations made
by sanctioned bank analysts. The DD estimates for other analysts are indistinguishable
from zero, and, hence, there is no evidence that analyst from other firm types are changing
their recommendation optimism in response to the reforms.
Table 4 also indicates that several control variables exhibit the expected association with
RROPT. Specifically, analysts who followed more firms and those who followed more new
firms are less optimistic in their recommendations, as are analysts from large securities
firms and from firms with specific industry expertise. Analysts who cover large companies
and high-growth companies (i.e., low book-to-market ratio) are also less optimistic in their
stock recommendations.
As for the two components of RROPT, the last two sets of columns in Table 4 show that
the estimated coefficient on D 3 SANCTIONED is significantly positive in the LessPOS
regression and significantly negative in the LessNEG regression. In other words, sanctioned
bank analysts not only issue less favorable recommendations after the reforms but also
more unfavorable recommendations than other analysts who follow the same companies.
Taken together, these two findings explain why sanctioned bank analysts became relatively
less optimistic after the reforms. Finally, similar to what we document in the RROPT
regression, none of the other DD estimates (i.e., the coefficients on the interaction terms)
are statistically different from zero, suggesting that analysts from other securities firms are
no less positive or negative in their stock recommendations than those from research firms.
Using a shorter postreform period, two related studies have tested the impact of the
reforms on the properties of investment bank recommendations.12 Barber et al. (2006) find
that (a) the percentage of buy recommendations issued by sanctioned banks is, on average,
only slightly higher than that issued by nonsanctioned banks before NASD 2711 became
effective and (b) sanctioned banks exhibit a much bigger drop in the percentage of buys
than nonsanctioned banks in the 10-month period after NASD 2711. Our test differs from
theirs in three respects. First, we extend their analysis by documenting the fact that after
the reforms, sanctioned bank analysts issue relatively fewer optimistic recommendations
than other analysts who follow the same companies. Hence, sanctioned bank analysts were
not only less optimistic than their nonsanctioned bank counterparts but also less optimistic
than analysts from syndicate, brokerage, and research firms. Second, we report a relative,
instead of an absolute, optimism metric.13 The use of the relative optimism metric rules out
the possibility that the percentage of buys issued by sanctioned banks drops much more
than that of nonsanctioned banks because they follow different companies, and these com-
panies are affected differently by the market downturn around the implementation of
NASD 2711. Third, we examine optimism bias at the analyst level, instead of at the bank
level. This allows us to control for both cross-sectional and time-series differences in ana-
lyst characteristics in our regression analysis.
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Kadan et al. (2009) show that affiliated investment banks are as likely to issue optimistic
recommendations (defined as ‘‘strong buys’’ or ‘‘buys’’) as unaffiliated banks in the postre-
form period September 2002 to December 2004. However, there is no change in the reluc-
tance of affiliated investment banks to issue pessimistic recommendations (defined as
‘‘underperform’’ and ‘‘sell’’) than nonaffiliated banks. Unlike the research design of Kadan
et al., our research does not use affiliation to capture conflicts of interest, and we use a
relative optimism metric. We add to their results by showing that sanctioned bank analysts
(not just affiliated investment bank analysts) become less optimistic than other analysts
who follow the same companies. In contrast to their results, we also document that sanc-
tioned bank analysts are issuing more pessimistic recommendations relative to other ana-
lysts who follow the same companies. With a postreform period extended to 2007, we are
able to investigate the long-term impact of the reforms.14
In summary, we document evidence consistent with the conflicts-of-interest reforms
reducing the relative optimism of stock recommendations made by sanctioned bank ana-
lysts. It is unclear whether the drop in the optimism of stock recommendations would bene-
fit investors. One way to address this issue is to examine the impact of the reforms on the
profitability of analyst recommendations, which we turn to next.
Profitability of Stock Recommendation
To address whether the reforms have any economic consequence on stock recommenda-
tions, we compare and contrast the profitability of recommendations in the pre- and postre-
form periods. We compute the profitability of stock recommendations using the
methodology of Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), except that we form trading portfo-
lios at the analyst level instead of at the securities firm level. Specifically, we classify the
upgrades to buy or strong buy, initiations, resumptions, and reiterations of coverage with a
buy or strong buy rating into a buy portfolio. A stock enters the buy portfolio on the date
when the recommendation is issued. The stock leaves the portfolio either on the day before
the next downgraded recommendation or after 255 trading days following the initial recom-
mendation, whichever comes first. The hold/sell portfolio is constructed similarly. Each
portfolio consists of all the companies an analyst follows and is updated daily. Daily abnor-
mal return is the alpha from the estimation of the Fama–French three factors plus the
Carhart momentum factor regression model (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993), esti-
mated by analyst and over the pre- and postreform periods.
Table 5 summarizes the findings. Panel A shows that average daily abnormal returns for
the buy portfolios of research firm analysts drop from 4.5 basis points before the reforms to
2.1 basis points after the reforms, but the change is indistinguishable from zero. Similarly,
we also see a drop in the recommendation profitability for brokerage and syndicate firm
analysts, although not significantly so. However, the changes for both nonsanctioned and
sanctioned investment bank analysts are significantly negative. However, the drop in the
profitability of investment bank recommendations is not significantly different from that of
research firms, as shown in columns 8 and 9.
Panel B reports the results for the hold/sell portfolio. It indicates that after the reforms,
average abnormal returns of hold/sell recommendations made by all types of analysts
decrease (i.e., it become more profitable), with such decreases being statistically significant
for analysts from research firms, brokerage firms, and nonsanctioned banks. The statistics
in columns 6 to 9 show that the changes are not statistically different from those of
research firms.
458 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Regressions of the Level of Recommendation Optimism (N =
11,021)
Average recommendation
level
Average adjusted
recommendation level
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics
Intercept 2139.08 212.52*** 29.47 3.34***
D 223.23 23.29* 8.47 1.59
BROKERAGE 24.22 20.43 22.64 20.34
SYNDICATE 26.89 20.95 24.45 20.79
NONSANC 0.90 0.13 0.89 0.18
SANCTIONED 3.53 0.50 0.33 0.06
D 3 BROKERAGE 3.25 0.29 0.58 0.07
D 3 SYNDICATE 0.85 0.10 2.58 0.40
D 3 NONSANC 210.79 21.57 23.28 20.64
D 3 SANCTIONED 236.97 25.26*** 220.60 23.90***
Relative accuracy 0.05 1.08 0.12 2.93***
Forecast horizon 20.04 22.65** 20.04 22.99***
Experience 0.11 0.75 0.013 1.07
Number of companies following 20.30 23.17*** 20.15 21.98**
Industry specialization 24.31 21.59 2.38 1.06
Analyst turnover 3.60 1.70* 1.04 0.60
Percentage of new following 22.65 20.83 25.14 21.94*
Brokerage firm size rank 20.20 22.76*** 20.13 22.33**
Brokerage firm specialization 226.93 25.18*** 213.11 23.14***
Company size 22.67 23.93*** 21.20 22.15**
Leverage 215.53 22.99*** 22.20 20.50
Gross margin 20.003 20.41 20.001 20.14
Sales growth 20.03 20.54 20.01 20.19
Book-to-market 26.43 21.89* 5.35 2.06**
External financing 25.89 3.91*** 20.33 20.06
R2 .112 .023
Note: This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the following regression:
DEPit5a01a1D1a2BROKERAGE1a3SYNDICATE1a4NONSANC1a5SANCTIONED
1a6D3 BROKERAGE1a7D3 SYNDICATE1a8D3NONSANC1a9D3 SANCTIONED
1 CONTROLS1 et;
where the dependent variable, DEP, is either average recommendation level or average adjusted recommendation
level.
Average recommendation level is the average of all stock recommendations made by an analyst in a particular year.
Average adjusted recommendation level is the average of all stock recommendations made by an analyst minus the
average of all the recommendations made by other analysts who follow the same companies. The dependent vari-
ables are multiplied by 100. D is an indicator variable that equals to one in the postreform period (January 2004 to
December 2007) and zero in the prereform period (January 1998 to December 2001). BROKERAGE is an indicator
variable that equals to one for analysts from brokerage firms and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator vari-
able that equals to one for analysts from syndicate firms and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable
that equals to one for analysts from nonsanctioned full-service investment banks and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED
is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks and zero oth-
erwise. CONTROLS represent a set of control variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are
defined in the section titled ‘‘Model Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics.’’ Year-fixed effects
are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered by analyst.
*, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t
test.
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In the section titled ‘‘Recommendation Optimism,’’ we find that sanctioned bank ana-
lysts become relatively less positive and more negative in their recommendations after the
reforms. Hence, the shift in the distribution of their recommendations implies that their buy
recommendations should become more profitable, whereas their sells should become less
profitable.15 However, in Table 5, column 5 shows that the average change in the profit-
ability of buys for sanctioned bank analysts is significantly negative, whereas that of sells
is insignificantly different from zero. This finding leads us to conclude that, although the
reforms reduce the optimism of sanctioned bank analysts’ recommendations, the reduction
does not lead to improvement in the profitability of their recommendations.
Our prereform period (1998-2001) results are consistent with the findings in Barber
et al. (2007) that there is no significant difference in the stock recommendation perfor-
mance between analysts from research firms (including brokerage firms) and those from
investment banks for the period January 1996-March 2000. Furthermore, Barber et al. find
a significant difference in the returns to investment bank and research firm recommenda-
tions in the period from March 2000 through June 2003, suggesting that the reforms have
economic consequence. We provide evidence from a long postreform period (January
2004-December 2007) that the reforms have different impact on buy and sell recommenda-
tions, but overall, these reforms do not lead to improvement in the profitability of stock
recommendations made by investment bank analysts.
Robustness Checks
This subsection includes a series of sensitivity analyses using the same DD research
design.16
First, following prior studies (e.g., Chen & Chen, 2009; Cowen et al., 2006), we use the
level of stock recommendations instead of relative recommendation optimism as the depen-
dent variable (1 = strong sell, 2 = sell, 3 = hold, 4 = buy, and 5 = strong buy).17 Given that
our observations are at the analyst-year level, we calculate the average of all recommenda-
tions made by each analyst in a particular year. As the dependent variable is an average of
many discrete values, it is close to a continuous variable when the number of stock recom-
mendations made by an analyst increases (Table 2 indicates that the average analyst covers
at least 11 companies), and we use the ordinary least squares method to estimate the regres-
sion. The results reported in Table 6 are stronger than our original findings in Table 4. In
particular, the t statistic on the interaction term D 3 SANCTIONED in the average recom-
mendation level regression is 5.26. Furthermore, we account for company-fixed effects by
subtracting from each recommendation the mean of all recommendations for the same com-
pany made by other analysts in the same calendar quarter. The result is summarized under
the column titled ‘‘Average adjusted recommendation level.’’ The regression result is
robust to the mean adjustment, with the t statistics on the D 3 SANCTIONED term being
3.90.
Second, the composition of our sample changes over time: analysts switch employers,
new analysts enter the industry, old analysts exit the industry, and research firms, brokers,
and banks are added to and dropped from the I/B/E/S database. As a result, the characteris-
tics of the analysts, the firms they work for, and the companies they follow are changing
during the sample period. We have already controlled for these sources of variation in the
DD regression. As a robustness check, we redo our tests using a sample of analysts who
are present in both the pre- and postreforms periods. We lose two thirds of our analysts due
to this strict constraint. Untabulated results show that the original result on the interaction
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term D 3 SANCTIONED in the RROPT regression is no longer statistically significant;
the qualitative results for the LessPOS and LessNEG regressions remain unchanged. As the
constraint leads to a significant reduction in sample size, survivorship bias could become a
problem in this sensitivity analysis. We believe that our original sample is more representa-
tive of the general population of analysts.
Third, if we cluster standard errors at the securities firm level, the estimated coefficients
on D 3 SANCTIONED for the RROPT and LessPOS regressions in Table 4 (relative rec-
ommendation optimism) will become statistically insignificant. The statistical inference of
the results reported in Table 6 (recommendation level) is not affected. It is generally true
that standard errors are larger (significance levels are lower) when they are clustered at a
higher level of aggregation, as the number of clusters decreases. However, our choice of
clustering standard errors at the analyst level is in line with prior studies. For example,
Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas (2009) and Chen and Chen (2009) use a sample of
company-month observations based on analysts’ consensus forecasts and recommendations;
they compute t statistics using robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by company.
As we use a sample of analyst-year observations, we cluster the standard errors by ana-
lyst.18 Furthermore, Cowen et al. (2006) use a sample of individual analyst forecasts and
recommendations, and they adjust standard errors for clustering by analyst. Kadan et al.
(2009) examine a sample of individual analyst recommendations, and they report standard
errors clustered at the company level (pp. 16-17). Our t statistics are no less conservative
than those used in these studies. By aggregating individual forecasts and recommendations
Figure 2. Relative forecast optimism for equity analysts from five types of securities firms, 1998 to
2007
Note: Relative forecast optimism, RFOPT, is forecasted earnings minus actual earnings, scaled by the
standard deviation of all forecasts for the same company. The graph plots the annual averages of
RFOPT for analysts from five different types of securities firms: research firms, brokerage firms, syndi-
cate banks, nonsanctioned investment banks, and sanctioned investment banks.
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Table 8. Difference-in-Differences Regressions of Relative Forecast Optimism and Accuracy (N =
11,021)
Relative forecast optimism Relative forecast accuracy
Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic
Intercept 232.19 23.17*** 68.51 22.07***
D 9.25 1.51 1.97 0.89
BROKERAGE 1.86 0.24 2.52 0.95
SYNDICATE 23.21 20.51 3.35 1.51
NONSANC 22.60 20.46 3.55 1.74*
SANCTIONED 20.25 20.04 4.05 1.92*
D 3 BROKERAGE 21.24 20.14 23.58 21.18
D 3 SYNDICATE 26.90 20.98 22.36 20.97
D 3 NONSANC 26.04 21.01 22.94 21.39
D 3 SANCTIONED 29.63 21.57 25.16 22.39**
Relative forecast accuracy 0.28 6.86***
Forecast horizon 0.03 1.86* 20.02 23.98***
Experience 0.07 0.61 20.13 23.33***
Number of companies following 20.04 20.54 20.03 21.28
Industry specialization 0.99 0.45 1.57 2.16**
Analyst turnover 4.26 2.41** 218.11 234.68***
Percentage of new following 7.17 2.46** 24.26 24.71***
Brokerage firm size rank 20.02 20.36 0.04 2.22**
Brokerage firm specialization 20.21 20.05 23.12 22.13**
Company size 0.92 1.62 20.19 21.02
Leverage 24.08 20.91 24.21 22.76***
Gross margin 0.002 0.19 20.003 21.44
Sales growth 0.01 0.30 0.004 0.33
Book-to-market 22.28 20.86 20.15 20.16
External Financing 2.68 0.44 28.34 24.38***
R2 .013 .145
Note: This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the following regression:
DEPit5a01a1D1a2BROKERAGE1a3SYNDICATE1a4NONSANC1a5SANCTIONED
1a6D3 BROKERAGE1a7D3 SYNDICATE1a8D3NONSANC1a9D3 SANCTIONED
1 CONTROLS1 et;
where the dependent variable, DEP, is either relative forecast optimism or relative forecast accuracy. Forecast opti-
mism is forecasted earnings minus actual earnings, scaled by the standard deviation of all forecasts for the same
company. Forecast optimism is multiplied by 100. Relative forecast accuracy is forecast accuracy rank for all com-
panies followed by an analyst. D is an indicator variable that equals to one in the postreform period (January 2004
to December 2007) and zero in the prereform period (January 1998 to December 2001). BROKERAGE is an indica-
tor variable that equals to one for analysts from brokerage firms and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator
variable that equals to one for analysts from syndicate firms and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable
that equals to one for analysts from nonsanctioned full-service investment banks and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED
is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks and zero oth-
erwise. CONTROLS represent a set of control variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are
defined in the section titled ‘‘Model Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics.’’ Year-fixed effects
are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered by analyst.
*, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t
test.
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at the analyst level, we completely remove any correlation among forecasts and recommen-
dations issued by the same analyst.
Empirical Findings on Earnings Forecasts
Relative Forecast Optimism
We estimate the relative forecast optimism measures following Clement (1999) and others.
The measure, RFOPT, is calculated as follows:
RFOPTtkijt 5
FORECASTtkijt  FORECASTtkjt
STDDEV ðFORECASTtkjt Þ
;
where FORECASTtkijt is analyst i’s forecast of company j’s earnings for fiscal year t, as of
t 2 k. FORECASTtkjt and STDDEV ðFORECASTtkjt Þ are, respectively, the average and
standard deviation of all forecasts for company j and fiscal year t, as of t 2 k.19 Following
prior literature (Cowen et al., 2006), we use only the first forecast made by each analyst at
the beginning of the fiscal year (t 2 k) for the same company and forecast period
(FY1—the current fiscal year). We compute RFOPTtkijt only for companies that are fol-
lowed by at least three analysts. RFOPTtkijt is then averaged across all companies followed
by analyst i in calendar year t to compute analyst i’s average relative forecast optimism at
calendar year t, RFOPTtkit . By construction, this measure controls for company- and time-
specific factors that would affect forecast optimism across analysts.
Table 7, Panel A reports the levels of and changes in average relative forecast optimism
of annual earnings made by analysts from different firm types.20 The changes in relative
forecast optimism are 0.076, 0.055, 0.005, 0.010, and 20.026 for analysts from research,
brokerage, syndicate, nonsanctioned, and sanctioned firms, respectively. None of these
changes are statistically different from zero. However, column 9 shows that the change in
the relative forecast optimism of sanctioned bank analysts is statistically more negative
than that of their research firm counterparts.
Figure 2 plots the annual relative forecast optimism by firm type. It shows that the rela-
tive forecast optimism of the sanctioned bank analysts is very similar to that of other ana-
lysts in both the pre- and postreform periods. The relative forecast optimism of the
sanctioned bank analysts does not exhibit a clear trend after the reforms and its movement
is close to that of the analysts from other types of securities firms.
Table 8 summarizes the DD regression results. In the relative forecast optimism regres-
sion, none of the DD estimates (i.e., those on the interaction terms) are statistically differ-
ent from zero. This result indicates that the changes in relative forecast optimism around
the reforms are not significantly different between research firm analysts and their invest-
ment bank counterparts. In other words, we do not observe any significant change in the
incentives of analysts making optimistic earnings forecasts across different firm types. As
for the control variables, the results indicate that analysts who experience high turnover
and cover many new companies are relatively more optimistic.
In sum, we document evidence consistent with the reforms having no statistical effect
on the relative forecast optimism of investment bank analysts. This is in contrast to what
we find for stock recommendations. The fact that securities regulators focus their attention
on stock recommendations rather than earnings forecasts might explain these results. In
464 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
other words, sanctioned investment banks reduce their stock recommendation optimism in
response to the reforms but leave their earnings forecasts optimism unchanged, partly
because earnings forecasts are not the focus of the reform.
Relative Forecast Accuracy
We next examine the consequence of the reforms on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
The calculation of relative forecast accuracy is given in the section titled ‘‘Model
Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistic’’.
Panel B in Table 7 shows striking results. First, the initial row of the panel indicates that
in the prereform period, the forecasts of brokerage, syndicate, nonsanctioned, and sanc-
tioned firms are more accurate than those of research firms. Second, the accuracy of
research firm analysts improves after the reforms. In contrast, sanctioned and nonsanc-
tioned investment bank analysts become significantly less accurate after the reforms,
although they are still statistically more accurate than their research bank counterparts in
the postreform period (as shown in columns 8 and 9).
The multivariate result for relative forecast accuracy is given in the last set of columns
in Table 8. The estimated coefficients on NONSANC and SANCTIONED are statistically
positive, indicating that the earnings forecasts made by analysts from nonsanctioned and
sanctioned investment banks are relatively more accurate than those made by analysts from
research firms in the prereform period. On the contrary, the DD estimate is significantly
negative for sanctioned banks only. This is consistent with the reforms having a differential
impact on the accuracy of research firm and sanctioned investment bank analysts.
In summary, the reforms targeting investment bank analysts have negatively affected the
forecast accuracy of investment bank analysts and unexpectedly improves the accuracy of
research firm analysts. The former might be due to the fact that investment bank research
departments lose their funding from investment banking businesses. The latter might be
attributed to the fact that the Global Settlement provides US$432.5 million to support inde-
pendent analyst research. Indeed, the statistics in Table 2 show that research firm analysts
cover fewer companies and experience less turnover after the reforms. As a result, the accu-
racy of sanctioned investment bank analysts is no longer significantly better than their
research firm counterparts after the reforms.
Robustness Checks
We conduct three sets of sensitivity analyses. First, Regulation Full Disclosures (Reg FD)
might affect our results because its effective date of October 2000 falls within our prere-
form period (1998-2001). Prior literature examining the impact of Reg FD on analyst fore-
cast accuracy finds mixed results. Although Bailey, Li, and Mao (2003) show that Reg FD
had no impact on accuracy, Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006) document that forecasts
became less accurate post Reg FD. The sample period used by Bailey et al. (2003) ends in
the second quarter of 2001, so it has a short post–Reg FD period. The sample period in
Agrawal et al. (2006) ends in June 2004, so it includes the effects of the conflicts-of-
interest reforms.
We repeat our analysis including only year 2001 in the prereform period. Our results
(not tabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the conflicts-of-interest
reforms, not Reg FD, are associated with our findings.
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Second, we examine relative forecast optimism and relative forecast accuracy in our
main tests because they control for firm-specific effects (Clement, 1999; Cowen et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, it is important to know whether our conclusions are sensitive to the
use of the relative measures. When we use absolute forecast optimism and absolute forecast
accuracy as the dependent variables in the DD regressions, our original results are robust.
Furthermore, most of the control variables exhibit significant explanatory power for ana-
lysts’ absolute optimism and absolute accuracy.
Third, as in the section titled ‘‘Robustness Checks,’’ we repeat our analysis on a sample
of analysts who were present in both the pre- and postreforms periods. Untabulated results
indicate that our original findings on the effect of the reforms on earnings forecast opti-
mism and accuracy are robust to the imposition of this sample restriction.
Finally, if we cluster standard errors at the securities firm level, the significance level of
the estimated coefficients on D 3 SANCTIONED remains unchanged.
Concluding Remarks
This article examines the consequences of a series of reforms that aim at resolving analyst
conflicts of interest driven by the investment banking business. We conduct our tests on
analysts from different types of securities firms: research firms, brokerage firms, syndicate
banks, nonsanctioned investment banks, and sanctioned investment banks. We use securi-
ties firm type to capture the level of investment banking–related conflicts of interest facing
the analysts. We examine the change in analysts’ research biases between the prereform
period (January 1998-December 2001) and postreform period (January 2004-December
2007).
We find a significant reduction in the relative optimism of stock recommendations but
no significant change in the relative optimism of earnings forecasts made by sanctioned
investment bank analysts. We also document that the accuracy of investment bank forecasts
drops, and the profitability of its stock recommendations remains unchanged after the
reforms. Taken together, our evidence from an investigation of the 4-year-long postreform
period suggests that although the conflict-of-interest reforms reduce the optimism of stock
recommendations issued by sanctioned investment bank analysts, the reforms also have an
unintended negative consequence: Specifically, investors do not gain economic benefits
from the less pessimistic stock recommendations, although they receive less accurate earn-
ings forecasts.
It should be noted that we capture the level of analysts’ conflicts of interest using the
type of securities firms, and, hence, we do not test whether affiliated investment bank ana-
lysts are more biased than their nonaffiliated counterparts. In a related study, Kadan et al.
(2009) show that affiliated investment banks are as likely to issue optimistic recommenda-
tions as unaffiliated banks in the postreform period from September 2002 to December
2004. However, they find no change in the reluctance of affiliated investment banks to
issue pessimistic recommendations as compared with nonaffiliated banks. We add to their
results by showing that sanctioned bank analysts become less optimistic than other analysts
(not just affiliated analysts) who follow the same companies. In contrast to their results, we
also document that sanctioned bank analysts are issuing more pessimistic recommendations
relative to other analysts who follow the same companies.
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Notes
1. An alternative way to capture investment banking incentives is to divide investment bank ana-
lysts into affiliated and nonaffiliated analysts. However, nonaffiliated analysts also have incen-
tive to bias their research to help their banks attract future investment banking business (e.g.,
Bradley, Jordan, & Ritter, 2006). As the reforms target all investment banks, we believe that our
partitioning is the appropriate one for addressing our research questions. Prior studies using the
affiliation classification have found mixed results. In particular, Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin
and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000)
find that affiliated analysts make more optimistic earnings growth forecasts and more favorable
recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. Michaely and Womack also find that the stock rec-
ommendations of affiliated analysts underperform those of unaffiliated analysts for a sample of
initial public offering (IPO) firms. However, Dugar and Nathan, Lin and McNichols, and
McNichols, O’Brien, and Pamukcu (2007) find no statistical difference in the profitability of buy
recommendations issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts.
2. The different outcomes could be due to the fact that the reforms focus on optimistic stock recom-
mendations, and earnings forecasts are seldom mentioned in any of the legislations.
3. Our study is silent on the effect of the reforms on the alignment of earnings-based valuation esti-
mates and stock recommendations, which are addressed in Barniv Hope, Myring, and Thomas
(2009) and Chen and Chen (2009). See Bradshaw (2009) for a discussion. Our study is also
silent on whether a subset of investors benefit from the reforms. For example, De Franco, Lu,
and Vasvari (2007) show that analysts’ research biases adversely affect small investors but not
institutional investors, and Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) find that analyst
biases are smaller for firms with higher institutional ownership due to the monitoring role of
institutional investors.
4. Indeed, only a few of the retail clients of these sanctioned investment banks actually request
these independent research reports (Kim, 2009).
5. The two bodies have now consolidated most of these operations into the Financial Industrial
Regulatory Authority (2005).
6. Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) stops providing the translation file for academic
research after 2006. We use the 2006 translation file to identify analyst affiliation in 2007.
Hence, we lose new investment research firms (and their analysts) that were added to I/B/E/S in
2007.
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7. The broker identifier in the I/B/E/S translation file is provided at the subsidiary level. We manu-
ally check the name of each subsidiary and assign them under its parent securities firm, which is
given in the Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research.
8. Lead or colead underwriters (or book runners) are chosen by the issuers (IPO or Seasoned Equity
Offering companies) to handle all aspects of the equity offerings, including pricing, marketing,
and distributing. The managers or comanagers are selected by the lead or colead underwriters to
facilitate distribution of the offering. See Cowen Groysberg, and Healy (2006) and Ljungqvist,
Marston, and Wilhelm (2009).
9. If an analyst changes jobs from one firm type to another, we assign her to the firm type of her
original employer in the switching year. The results (not tabulated) are robust if we exclude
these analysts from our sample.
10. These results are reported in a previous draft of the article, which is available on request from
the authors.
11. For example, assume analyst i follows a company with a hold recommendation. There are nine
other analysts following the same company and their recommendations are 3 buys, 4 holds, and
2 sells. LessPOS and LessNEG will be 30% and 20%, respectively, for analyst i. If one of these
analysts downgrades from a hold to a sell, analyst i’s LessPOS and LessNEG will change to 30%
and 30%, respectively. In other words, analyst i becomes relatively less negative (i.e., LessNEG
increases), because one more analyst has a more unfavorable recommendation than her; however,
LessPOS remains unchanged. If another analyst upgrades from a sell to a buy, analyst i’s
LessPOS and LessNEG will change to 40% and 20%, respectively. In other words, analyst i
becomes both relatively less positive (i.e., LessPOS increases) and more negative (i.e., LessNEG
decreases).
12. In their review of the extant literature, Mehran and Stulz (2007) point out that ‘‘some of the
effects of these [conflicts-of-interest] regulations might not be noticeable with such a short
sample period’’ (p. 292). Our tests supplement these two studies by examining a longer postre-
form sample period. Moreover, our research design is different from those of these two studies
and, hence, our study provides triangulating evidence on the economic consequences of the
reforms.
13. In sensitivity tests, we find that the results are robust when we use an absolute optimism
measure.
14. Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) find that many securities firms moved from a five-
tier stock rating system to a three-tier system in 2002. All post-2006 I/B/E/S data tapes include
retrospective changes to brokers’ alterations of their recommendation scales (Ljungqvist, Malloy,
& Marston, 2009). As we use the 2008 I/B/E/S data, our results are not affected by the change in
the stock rating system.
15. This follows the logic of Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006). They predict and
find that the buy (sell) recommendations issued by optimistic securities firms earn lower (higher)
abnormal returns than those issued by less optimistic firms.
16. We thank the referee for suggesting these robustness checks.
17. The recommendation level is defined in such a way that the sign on the difference-in-differences
estimators is identical to that in Table 4 (relative recommendation optimism).
18. Clustering standard errors at the securities firm level in our tests will be equivalent to clustering
standard errors at the industry level in Barniv et al. (2009) and Chen and Chen (2009).
19. We winsorize forecast optimism at the 1st and 99th percentiles because some standard devia-
tions, the deflator, are extremely small. Results are qualitatively similar if we scale this measure
by stock price.
20. The sample used in this section is the same as that used in the stock recommendation tests. If we
do not restrict the sample here to have stock recommendation data, the sample size will increase
from 11,201 to 18,918. The results (not tabulated) based on the larger sample are more signifi-
cant, but qualitatively similar, to those reported in the table.
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